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Human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research promises to enhance the way that we
understand, prevent, and treat disease, potentially alleviating human suffering on a
global scale. However it also involves the destruction of the nascent human life form
from which stem cells are derived. Herein lies what Devolder depicts as ‘The Prob-
lem’: either one supports hESC research and accepts resulting embryo destruction,
or one opposes it and accepts that the potential benefits of hESC research will be
foregone (p. 2).
Despite attributing significant moral status to human embryos, few modern polities
have chosen to completely outlaw hESC research. Following the debates of the 1990s
and early millennium, many countries adopted bright-line distinctions between per-
missible and impermissible forms of hESC research. Devolder examines two such
approaches, the ‘Discarded-Created’ distinction and the ‘Use-Derivation’ distinction
to determine whether these bright-lines are ethically defensible or, alternatively, are
based upon dubious distinctions (p. 26). The former permits the use of embryos
donated to research by individuals/couples who no longer require them for reproduc-
tive purposes following IVF, but eschews the deliberate creation of embryos for
embryo research. The Use-Derivation approach permits the use of publicly available
stem cell lines for research, but outlaws the derivation of embryonic cells from human
embryos.
Of the two categories Devolder’s discussion of the Discarded-Created distinction in
Chapter 2 is the most extensive. Devolder questions why, if permitting hESC research
on surplus embryos is justified on the grounds that it enables beneficial research which
is considered to outweigh the cost of embryo destruction, the same moral cost-benefit
calculus should not extend to created-for-research-embryos (hereinafter CREs).
One plausible concept that might justify the Discarded-Created distinction is the
‘Nothing-is-Lost principle’ (NILp), previously discussed in ‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’
forms by Dan Brock (‘Creating Embryos for Use in Stem Cell Research’, Journal of
Law and Medical Ethics 38 (2010): 229–237, at p. 232). Devolder formulates a mixed
version of the principle such that ‘it is presumptively permissible to intentionally cause
a loss that it would normally be impermissible to intentionally cause if (1) the loss is
going to occur given what others will in fact do and regardless of what the agent does
(from among the reasonable options), and (2) something good is expected to come
out of causing that loss’ (p. 39).
Accordingly, using a discarded embryo for hESC research is presumptively permissi-
ble because its death is inevitable and will occur regardless of what can reasonably be
expected of any agent/researcher in the circumstances. However, proponents of the
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Discarded-Created Distinction consider that the NILp does not justify CREs because
such embryos need not have been created in the first place.
Devolder challenges whether this fact constitutes a morally relevant distinction,
rejoinding that if an embryo’s moral status is such that it should never be created and
destroyed, nor should excess IVF embryos be routinely created in the process of IVF.
(Devolder points out that conventional IVF involves the deliberate creation/cryopreser-
vation of multiple embryos. The only alternative is to fertilise one or two eggs at a
time and transfer both in a single cycle, but this significantly increases the number of
cycles and associated hormone therapy required to achieve a live birth and is generally
considered contrary to a woman’s interests.) Indeed in the year 2014–2015 over
172,000 IVF embryos were discarded in the United Kingdom alone (22 November
2016, UKHL 3705 per Lord Prior of Brampton). However, an important final consid-
eration when applying the NILp is whether the good accrued from the loss caused is
proportionate to the ‘agency cost’ of CREs. The agency cost is the ‘moral cost of an
agent being related in a certain way to the loss she causes’ (p. 48).
It is possible that permitting CREs may increase the demand for such embryos and
contribute to future systematic embryo research/destruction. This may render the
agency cost disproportionate to the good obtained, thereby negating the NILp. How-
ever Devolder counters that IVF may also promote embryo destruction by, for exam-
ple, softening attitudes to embryo destruction and removing incentives to avoid the
creation of surplus embryos during IVF. On this account, both the Discarded and
Created contexts share the same ‘wrong-making’ feature and the same agency cost:
both involve intentional embryo destruction and both ‘foreseeably’ contribute to ‘fu-
ture embryo deaths’ (p. 54). Thus, if it is accepted that the NILp fails to justify using
CREs for hESC research, the same should be true of discarded embryos. Alternatively,
if it is accepted that the good accrued from hESC research using discarded embryos is
proportionate to the agency cost, the same should be true of using a CRE. Ultimately
Devolder concludes that the NILp cannot sustain the Discarded-Created distinction.
Rather, it presumptively justifies research in both, or in neither.
An alternative argument suggesting that it is worse to create and destroy embryos
for research than to destroy surplus embryos is based on the Doctrine of Double
Effect (DDE). The DDE provides that when seeking to bring about a good end, it
may be permissible to bring about a foreseeable but unintended harm, even though it
would be impermissible to deliberately cause such harm as a means to bringing about
the good end. However, if an embryo has full moral status, double effect reasoning
surely cannot justify the deliberate creation of surplus embryos that is part of tradi-
tional IVF. Conversely, if we accept an embryo’s moral status is low enough to render
its creation/destruction proportionate to the good of traditional IVF (i.e. by reducing
the risk of maternal harm) ‘then it becomes very difficult to explain why the creation
and destruction of research embryos is impermissible’ given that CRE research may
benefit many people (p. 65). In this way Devolder dismantles the assumptions on
which the Discarded-Created distinction is based.
Devolder critiques the Use-Derivation distinction in Chapter 3, highlighting the
incongruity of permitting the use of stem cell lines that were derived from the very
embryo research considered illicit. She argues this legitimises and may encourage fur-
ther embryo destruction by contributing to the demand for stem cell lines. Ultimately
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Devolder argues that both the Created-Discarded and the Use-Derivation distinctions
share, to a greater or lesser extent, the moral taint of promoting embryo destruction.
Chapter 4 considers alternative means of deriving stem cells. Although one particu-
lar discovery may offer a partial solution i.e. directly re-programming adult somatic
cells to create induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSC), Devolder is sceptical that it
marks the end of the hESC debate. Different stem cells facilitate different types of
research. Further, developing iPSCs requires comparisons with the gold standard of
hESCs. Consequently iPSC does not displace the need for on-going hESC in the
short-to-medium term. Indeed the drive to perform embryo research is even less likely
to abate given the recent emergence of CRSPR technology.
Ultimately Devolder’s claims regarding current distinctions between permissible/im-
permissible forms of hESC research could be criticised as simply amounting to an
argument from consistency, while determining public policy in a pluralist society
involves different considerations than undertaking a purely philosophical exercise.
However, Devolder tackles this head-on. Policy-makers may adopt compromises for
prudential reasons, such as political self-interest and a concern not to alienate support-
ers. It may also be a pragmatic response to a highly politicised issue because it is more
likely to be accepted, and the public interest is better served by allowing some research
to be conducted rather than none. It is also plausible that adopting the middle ground
is considered to best respect reasonable moral disagreement. Depending on the reason
for deliberately adopting a compromise position, policy makers may still be promoting
a core social value.
Despite this, Devolder argues that compromises have significant costs. They may be
assumed to be epistemically correct, hampering the development of correct beliefs and
debate. It is here that Devolder reminds the reader that hers is a work of ethics, not
policy, and her message is clear. When defending a particular policy position, ethicists
should be transparent as to what they consider is the correct ethical position or, alter-
natively, is a pragmatic compromise in the face of competing considerations or values.
Devolder’s monograph is, as ever, an impressive work of logic and clarity on an
issue that continues to polarise. Her mastery of the topic is predicated on a rare ability
to engage with, and translate, sophisticated scientific processes as well as philosophical
concepts in an engaging and accessible manner.
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